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The proposition that the real rate of interest equals
the nominal rate minus the expected rate of inflation
(or alternatively, the nominal rate equals the real
rate plus expected inflation) has a long history ex-
tending back more than 240 years. William Douglass
articulated the idea as early as the 1740s to explain
how the overissue of colonial currency and the re-
sulting depreciation of paper money relative to coin
raised the yield on loans denominated in paper com-
pared to the yield on loans denominated in silver coin.
In 1811 Henry Thornton used the same notion to ex-
plain how an inflation premium was incorporated into
and generated a rise in British interest rates during
the Napoleonic wars. Jacob de Haas, writing in 1889,
employed the real/nominal rate idea to account for the
“third (inflationary) element” in interest rates, the
other two being a reward for capital and a payment
for risk. And in 1890, Alfred Marshall cited the
interest-inflation relationship as the key component in
his theory of the transmission mechanism through
which variations in the value of money generate trade
cycles. The relationship achieved its classic exposi-
tion in Irving Fisher’s  Appreciation and Interest
(1896) where it was refined, restated, elaborated, and
presented in the form in which it appears today.
Apparently, however, some modern economists are
largely unaware of this earlier tradition. As a result,
they erroneously see the real/nominal rate relation-
ship as a recent rather than an ancient idea. Thus,
for example, Lawrence H. Summers of the National
Bureau of Economic Research contends “that it was
not until the 20th century that the distinction” be-
tween nominal and real interest rates “was even
introduced into economic analysis.” [11; p. 48]
The purpose of this article is to show that the two-
rate distinction long predates the 20th century. More
precisely, this article demonstrates (1) that a rudi-
mentary version of the real/nominal rate relationship
had already been enunciated by the mid-1700s, (2)
that the relationship was thoroughly understood and
succinctly formulated by some of the leading 19th
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century classical and neoclassical monetary theorists,
(3) that it was presented in its modern form by the
end of the century, and therefore (4) that the notion
that it is a 20th century invention is totally erroneous.
In documenting these points, the article traces the
pre-20th century evolution of the real/nominal rate
analysis from its earliest origins to its culmination in
Fisher’s  Appreciation and Interest.  As a preliminary
step, however, it is necessary to sketch the basic
outlines of this traditional analysis in order to demon-
strate how earlier writers contributed to it.
Key Propositions
As usually presented; the real/nominal interest
rate relationship expresses the nominal rate as the
sum of the real rate and a premium for expected
inflation or, what is the same thing, the real rate as
the nominal rate adjusted for expected inflation. In
symbols,
where n is the nominal or observed market interest
rate, r is the expected real interest rate associated
with the holding of real commodities or capital goods,
and p is the expected rate of price inflation or de-
preciation of the value of money.
Of these three variables, the real rate r is taken
to be a fixed constant equal to the given marginal
productivity of capital. To this real rate is equated
n-p, the anticipated real (inflation-corrected) yield
on money loans. The equality between these two
real rates is maintained by arbitrage, the operation
of which ensures that the expected real rates of
return on all assets are the same. Note, however,
that while  anticipated  real yields are continuously
equalized, the analysis recognizes that inflation fore-
casting errors may cause the  realized  real yield on
loans to deviate temporarily from its equilibrium
level corresponding to the given real rate on capital.
Such deviations will occur, for example, if people
either neglect to predict inflation or predict it extrap-
olatively from past inflation rates so that it (predicted
inflation) changes slowly when actual inflation
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dicted and therefore will not be fully incorporated
into nominal rates. As a result, the nominal rate will
not fully adjust for inflation and the realized real
rate on money loans will fall below its equilibrium
level. The fall in the realized real rate of course will
produce windfall profits for borrowers and windfall
losses to lenders. Assuming borrowers and lenders
predict future profits extrapolatively from these
realized windfall profits and losses and then act on
the basis of these predictions, the subsequent correc-
tive adjustment of loan demand and supply will tend
to bid up the nominal rate by the rate of inflation. In
this way the nominal rate eventually rises by the full
amount of inflation, thereby restoring the realized
real yield on loans to its equilibrium level.
From the foregoing analysis, earlier writers drew
four conclusions. First, the equilibrium nominal rate
fully adjusts for inflation leaving the realized real
rate on money loans intact. Second, such equilibrium
nominal rate adjustments render market rates high
in periods of inflation and low in periods of deflation.
Third, the same equilibrium nominal rate adjust-
ments entail no real effects. By leaving the real
yield on loans unchanged, they alter neither profits
nor losses nor incentives to borrow and lend. Nor
do they affect the distributive shares of borrowers
and lenders. Fourth, during the transitional adjust-
ment to equilibrium, however, incomplete nominal
rate changes can have temporary real effects. These
effects are of two kinds. First are the inevitable
income distribution effects on borrowers and lenders
owing to the incomplete adjustment of the nominal
rate and the resulting change in the realized real
rate. Second are possible output and employment
effects stemming from changes in the volume of
loans and business investment spending induced by
the real rate change. As shown below, however, the
occurrence of these output and employment effects
was postulated to depend upon the questionable as-
sumption of differential profit expectations as be-
tween borrowers and lenders. Constituting the essen-
tials of traditional real/nominal interest rate analysis,
the foregoing propositions originated with the 18th
and 19th century writers discussed below.
rates.
1 He did so in an effort to refute the notion
(as prevalent then as now) that easy money spells 
cheap money, i.e., that rapid monetary growth lowers
market interest rates. To show that paper money
expansion raises rather than reduces market rates,
he defined the nominal rate as the rate measured in
terms of paper currency and the real rate as the rate
measured in terms of silver coin. That is, he identi-
fied the nominal rate with the yield on loans denomi-
nated in paper and the real rate with the yield on
loans denominated in coin. Then, assuming the real
(coin) rate fixed by law, he argued that an expansion
of inconvertible paper currency would depreciate the
paper money relative to coin and thus lower the real
value of loans denominated in paper relative to those
denominated in coin, This would induce lenders to
demand a compensatory premium in the nominal
rate, thereby raising the latter by the full amount of
the depreciation. As summarized by him:
The quantity of paper credit sinks the value of the
principal, and the lender to save himself, is obliged
to lay the growing loss of the principal, upon the
interest. [5; p. 243]
In other words, lenders, foreseeing an inflation-
induced depreciation in the value of their principal,
will demand a premium equal to the expected rate of
depreciation to protect them from the loss. This
premium, when added to the rate of interest ex-
pressed in terms of coin, raises the nominal or paper
rate by the full amount of the expected rate of de-
preciation. In short, the nominal rate adjusts for
inflation to maintain equality between the real rate
on paper and the given real rate on silver.
William Douglass
To illustrate this point, Douglass argued that if the
rate of interest expressed in terms of coin were
legally fixed at 6 percent while paper was depreci-
ating relative to coin at a rate of 7 percent, then “the
lender to save his principal from sinking requires a
13 percent” nominal interest rate for the period of
the loan-this 13 percent nominal rate being the sum
of the 6 percent real (coin) rate and the 7 percent
rate of depreciation of paper with respect to coin.
[5; p. 339] Similarly, he pointed out that when
paper depreciates relative to coin at a rate of 22
percent per year the nominal (paper) rate corre-
sponding to a legal real (coin) rate of 6 percent
would be 28 percent per annum-this rate being the
sum of the 6 percent real rate and the 22 percent rate
of depreciation. In effect, he argued that the nominal
rate equals the real rate plus the expected rate of
William Douglass, an 18th century Scottish-born
physician, pamphleteer, controversialist, and student
of American colonial currencies was perhaps the first
to distinguish between real and nominal interest 
1 On Douglass, see Dorfman [3; pp. 155-162].
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ation of paper relative to coin. Since he assumed
that the rate of depreciation was fully foreseen and
incorporated into yields expressed in paper, he also
recognized that the equilibrium nominal rate fully
adjusts for actual inflation, leaving the realized real
rate unchanged. In this case currency depreciation
has no effect on real economic variables since it leaves
the real rate undisturbed.
From the foregoing propositions, Douglass con-
cluded that the nominal rate varies equiproportionally
with the rate of inflationary overissue of paper money
such that
. . . the larger the emissions, natural [i.e., nominal]
interest becomes the higher; therefore the advo-
cates for paper money (who are generally indigent
men, and borrowers) ought not to complain, when
they hire money at a dear nominal rate. [5; p.
340]
Accordingly debtors, he argued, have no grounds for
complaining that they are injured by high nominal
rates. For, with full adjustment of those rates with
respect to inflation, realized real rates and hence the
distribution of real income between creditors and
debtors remains unchanged. Here is the proposition
that equilibrium adjustments of the nominal rate are
neutral in their impact on real economic magnitudes.
To summarize, not only did Douglass articulate
the real/nominal interest rate relationship, he also
originated (1) the notion that the equilibrium nom-
inal rate must fully adjust for changes in the value of
money so as to leave the real rate unchanged, and
(2) the corresponding notion of the neutrality of
equilibrium changes in the nominal rate with respect
to distributive shares. This, plus his explanation of
how expected inflation premia get embodied in mar-
ket rates, marks him as an important early contribu-
tor to the two-rate analysis.
Henry Thornton (1760-1815)
The next writer to employ the real/nominal rate
relationship
2 was Henry Thornton, the British
2 Thornton expressed the relationship (albeit verbally,
not algebraically) in the form r = n - p, where r is the
realized real rate, n the nominal rate, and p the realized
rate of inflation. He noted (1) that inflation had occurred
at an average yearly rate of 2-3 percent over the period
1800-1810 and (2) that, as a result, if a man borrowed
money at a 5 percent nominal rate in 1800 and paid it
back in 1810, he would find that he had paid an actual
real rate of only 2-3 percent and not 5 percent as he
appeared to do. That is, he argued that p = 2-3 percent,
n = 5 percent, and r = 3-2 percent. He also pointed out
that when one borrows to finance the purchase of assets
the price of which rises with the rate of inflation, the real
cost of borrowing is only that part of the interest rate
that exceeds the price gain.
banker, evangelist, philanthropist, member of Parlia-
ment, and the outstanding monetary theorist of the
first half of the 19th century. Writing during the
Napoleonic wars when Britain was off the gold stand-
ard and the Bank of England was released  from its
obligation to convert paper into gold at a fixed price
upon demand, Thornton employed the relationship to
explain how the suspension of convertibility and the
resulting inflationary overissue of paper currency had
raised market yields in Britain. That is, he sought to
specify the mechanism through which an inflation
premium becomes embodied in market rates. More
precisely, he sought to show that the inflation pre-
mium enters the nominal rate even if nobody attempts
to predict inflation. For according to him, it is
profits and profit predictions rather than inflation
predictions per se that drive up the equilibrium
nominal rate. Tracing a chain of causation running
from unpredicted inflation and sluggish nominal rates
to realized real rates to profits both actual and ex-
pected, thence to loan demands and supplies and back
again to nominal rates, he argued that unexpected
inflation initially lowers the realized real loan rate
below the given real yield on capital. The result
is windfall realized profits for borrowers and wind-
fall losses to lenders. Assuming borrowers and
lenders predict future profits extrapolatively from
realized past profits and then adjust their loan de-
mands and supplies accordingly, the resulting rise
in loan demand and fall in loan supply will bid up the
nominal rate by the full amount of inflation, thereby
eliminating the real rate differential existing between
money loans and real capital investment. At this
point the real loan rate is restored to its equilibrium
level corresponding to full adjustment of the nominal
rate.
Accordingly, in countries in which the currency was
in a rapid course of depreciation, supposing that
there were no usury laws, the current rate of
interest was often, as he [Thornton] believed,
proportionably augmented. Thus, for example, at
Petersburgh, at this time, the current interest was
20 or 25 percent, which he conceived to be partly
compensation for an expected increase of depre-
ciation of the currency. [12; p. 336]
Here is the first rigorous and systematic account of
one version of the mechanism through which an infla-
tion premium becomes incorporated into interest
rates. And, although it conflicts with that part of his
analysis that ignores anticipated inflation, here also
is the first explicit acknowledgment that the premium
refers to expected future inflation.
Thornton’s contribution, consisting as it did of a
fully-articulated theory of how inflation drives up
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two-rate analysis. In terms of analytical insight,
clarity, rigor, and completeness, it remained unsur-
passed until Irving Fisher wrote his Appreciation
and Interest  in 1896. This of course is not to say that
other economists did not discuss the real/nominal
rate relationship during this time. On the contrary,
over the 86 year interval separating Thornton and
Fisher, at least four economists-namely John Stuart
Mill, Alfred Marshall, the Dutch writer Jacob de
Haas, and the American John Bates Clark-articu-
lated the relationship. None of these writers, how-
ever, knew of Thornton’s contribution and thus never
referred to it. Even Fisher, who acknowledged the
others as forerunners and cited them in his 1896
work, was apparently unaware of Thornton, whose
‘work had largely fallen into oblivion. Thus despite
its originality and insight, Thornton’s contribution
exerted little influence on the work of his 19th cen-
tury successors, of whom Mill was the first.
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)
Despite his ignorance of Thornton’s contribution,
John Stuart Mill nevertheless echoed the former’s
contention that interest rates include a premium for
expected inflation. Thus, in the sixth (1865) edition
of his Principles of Political Economy,  Mill wrote
that “the expectation of further depreciation” of the
currency raises market yields
because lenders who expect that their interest will
be paid, and the principal perhaps redeemed, in a
less valuable currency than they lent, of course
require a rate of interest sufficient to cover this
contingent loss. [9; p. 646]
Mill’s contribution consisted of recognizing, first, that
inflation reduces the real value of the interest as well
as the principal of a loan, and, second, that lenders
will therefore demand an inflation premium to cover
both types of expected loss. This was a new insight :
earlier writers had concentrated solely on the ex-
pected loss of principal and had said nothing about
the corresponding loss of interest. Mill’s insight was
later formalized by Marshall and Fisher, both of
whom added a cross-product term to the real/
nominal rate equation to account for inflation’s im-
pact on the real value of interest receipts.
Jacob de Haas
After Mill came the Dutch economist Jacob de
Haas. Writing in 1889, he argued that the expected
rate of change of the value of money constituted the
“third element” in market interest rates, the other
two being a payment for capital and a payment for
default risk, respectively. That is, he claimed that
the first element consists of “the remuneration for
abstinence, i.e., the hire of capital,” the second “the
insurance against loss or remuneration for risk,” and
the third “the expected change in the purchasing
power of money.” [2; pp. 110-111, 107] Since the
first two elements taken together comprise the real
rate of interest while the third element is the price
expectations term, de Haas’s formulation amounts
to the expression n = r + p where n is the nominal
or market rate, r the real rate, and p the expected
rate of price change. Depending upon whether prices
were expected to rise or fall, this latter variable, he
noted, could be either positive or negative, adding to
or subtracting from the given real rate as the case’
might be. The implication, he said, was that market
rates tend to be high during periods of inflation and
low in periods of deflation.
Finally, like Thornton, he contended that inflation
expectations get incorporated into market rates via
loan demand and supply. More precisely, he argued
that expected inflation causes lenders, who anticipate
a depreciation in the real value of their principal and
interest, to contract loan supply. Conversely, bor-
rowers, who anticipate repaying debts in depreciated
dollars, expand their loan demands. The resulting
fall in loan supply and rise in loan demand acts to
raise market rates.
All in all, de Haas contributed little new to the
analysis of real and nominal interest rates. His work,
despite its apparent originality, contains nothing that
cannot be found in Thornton, although Fisher, being
unaware of this, thought highly of him.
3 Marshall
too knew of his work and cited it in the first edition
of the Principles.
Alfred Marshall (1842-1924)
Marshall’s discussion of the real/nominal rate rela-
tionship appeared in the first (1890) edition of his
Principles of Economics  in a section entitled, appro-
priately enough, “Note on the Purchasing Power of
Money in Relation to the Real Rate of Interest.” He
was the first to use the words real and nominal to
refer to interest rates-his predecessors having used
one but not both of those expressions. He was also
the first to compute real rates taking account of
3 In the preface to his Appreciation and Interest, Fisher
says that, of all the writers who considered the real/
nominal rate relationship, “Mr. Jacob de Haas, Jr., of
Amsterdam, seems most fully to have realized its im-
portance.”
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as the principal of a loan. Specifically, he correctly
computed the annually-compounded realized real rate
(r) as the difference between the nominal rate (n),
the rate of inflation (p), and the cross-product (np)
of those two latter rates-this cross-product measur-
ing the effect of inflation on the real value of interest
receipts. That is, although he did not state the
formula
he was the first to compute the realized real rate
according to it. He did so when he stated that a 5
percent nominal rate is equivalent to a minus 5½
percent real rate after correction for a 10 percent
rate of inflation. He did so again when he said that a
5 percent nominal rate translates into a 15½ percent
real rate when prices are falling (the value of money
is rising) at a rate of 10 percent. In both cases, the
½ percent refers to the effect of changes in the value
of money on the real value of interest receipts. In
so doing, he improved upon the work of his prede-
cessors, all of whom, with the exception of John
Stuart Mill, computed the real rate according to the
approximation r = n - p that neglects the rate of
depreciation of interest payments.
Finally, although Marshall did not explain how
inflation expectations are formulated and embodied
in market rates, he did suggest that expectational
(i.e., inflation forecast) errors and the resulting devi-
ations of the realized real loan rate from its equilib-
rium level might, when borrowers and lenders hold
different expectations, generate trade cycles. Said
he, “When we come to discuss the causes of alter-
nating periods of inflation and depression of commer-
cial activity we shall find that they are intimately
connected with those variations in the real rate of
interest which are caused by changes in the pur-
chasing power of money.” [8; p. 628] Marshall’s
statement implies (1) that inflation expectations are
formed extrapolatively from realized past rates of
inflation such that expectations adjust slowly to
actual changes in inflation, and (2) that expectations
differ between borrowers and lenders so that loan
demands respond disproportionally to loan supplies
when expectations change. Of these two ideas, the
first ensures that expected inflation lags behind actual
inflation causing incomplete adjustment of the nom-
inal rate and a corresponding change in the realized
real rate. The second ensures that loan demand
curves shift disproportionally to loan supply curves
when expectations change, thereby resulting in alter-
ations in the volume of loans. Assuming these loans
are used to finance business investment projects, real
investment spending and thus the level of real eco-
nomic activity will be affected. Taken together, the
assumptions of extrapolative expectations and differ-
ential expectations as between borrowers and lenders
are sufficient to generate the real economic disturb-
ances Marshall had in mind. This is what he meant
when he suggested that fluctuations in the value of
money could generate trade cycles via the interest-
inflation relationship. Marshall’s suggestion was
later developed into a full-scale model of the trade
cycle by Irving Fisher.
J. B. Clark (1847-1938)
As indicated above, Marshall largely treated the
nominal rate as given and examined the impact of
observed inflation on the realized real loan rate. By
contrast, his contemporary John Bates Clark treated
the real loan rate as a constant and examined the
impact of anticipated inflation on the nominal rate.
Thus, in his 1895 article on “The Gold Standard of
Currency in the Light of Recent Theory,” Clark
argued that a perfectly foreseen inflation would be
“unerringly corrected” by equiproportional variations
in the nominal rate of interest so as to maintain the
real loan rate intact. To illustrate this, he said that
upon the anticipation of a negative 1 percent rate of
inflation, the nominal rate would immediately fall
from a 5 to a 4 percent level so as to keep the realized
real loan rate equal to the given 5 percent real yield
on capital. That is, he articulated the relationship
r = n - p according to which the nominal rate n
must vary in step with the inflation rate p to keep the
real loan rate fixed. Regarding this nominal rate
adjustment, he noted that it would have no effect on
real variables including the distribution of income
since "a debtor does not suffer nor a creditor gain
by a change in the purchasing power of coin, provided
that the change is generally anticipated.” [1 ; p. 393]
Here is the notion of the neutrality of equilibrium
nominal interest rate changes, In restating these old
propositions regarding nominal interest rate adjust-
ment and neutrality, Clark set the stage for Fisher’s
Appreciation and Interest.
Fisher’s Appreciation and Interest (1896)
The notion that real/nominal interest rate analysis
is a 20th century phenomenon originating with Irving
Fisher is disproved in his  Appreciation and Interest
(1896) where he makes it clear that he was by no
means the first to present that analysis. As proof,
he cites the earlier contributions of Douglass, Mill,
6 ECONOMIC REVIEW, MAY/JUNE 1983de Haas, Marshall, and Clark-all of whom helped
lay the groundwork for his own analysis. Containing
the earliest complete account of his theory of inflation
and interest,  Appreciation and Interest  constitutes
the high water mark in the pre-20th century develop-
ment of the subject. In it Fisher made at least four
advances over the work of his predecessors. First,
he derived the formula r = n - p - np, or alter-
natively, n = r + p + rp relating annually-
compounded inflation and interest rates. Second,
having derived the formula, he discussed the limit
values and behavior of its constituent variables under
conditions of perfect and imperfect foresight, respec-
tively, Third, he confronted the perfect foresight
(complete adjustment) hypothesis with empirical
data, and, when the facts failed to confirm the theory,
he constructed an alternative theory of sluggish nom-
inal rate adjustment under imperfect foresight.
Finally, he employed ‘this imperfect foresight theory
to explain how price changes generate trade cycles
by altering realized real loan interest rates.
Derivation of Formula
Regarding his derivation of the formula n =
r + p + rp he argued as follows: Suppose loan
contracts can be written either in terms of money or
in terms of goods. As mentioned above, let n be the
nominal or money interest rate and r be the real or
commodity interest rate. Also suppose that prices
rise at the expected rate p over the year, so that what
costs a dollar at the beginning of the year will cost
(1+p) dollars at year’s end. Assuming that at the
start of the year one dollar will buy one basket of
commodities, a person has the option of borrowing,
say, one dollar at money rate n for a year or, alter-
natively, one basket of commodities at real rate r
for a year. If he chooses the first, he must pay back
(1+n) dollars principal and interest when the loan
expires. If he chooses the second, he must pay back
(1+r) baskets of commodities which he can pur-
chase at a price of (1+p) dollars per basket when
the loan comes due. This price, when multiplied by
the number of baskets required to liquidate the loan,
results in a total dollar outlay of (1+p) (1+r). In
short, the costs of liquidating the loans expressed
in a common unit of account are (1+n) and
(1+p) (1+r) dollars, respectively. Now it is clear
that, with perfect arbitrage, equilibrium requires that
these two money sums be equal, i.e.,
(3) (1+n) = (1+p) (1+r),
such that the maturity values of both loans are the
same when expressed in terms of a common unit of
account. For if, say, commodity loans were cheaper
than money loans (i.e., the right side of the equation
was smaller than the left), then a profit could be
made by borrowing commodities, converting them
into dollars to be lent out at the money rate n, and
subsequently using the proceeds received from the
maturing money loan to purchase commodities with
which to retire the commodity debt. Given these
conditions, everyone would want to borrow com-
modities and ‘to lend money. The resulting increased
demand for commodity loans and the corresponding
increased supply of money loans would raise the
commodity rate of interest and lower the money rate
until the foregoing equality was restored. Expanding
equation 3 and solving for the nominal rate yields
(4) n = r +  P  + rp
where p, the rate of price inflation, is the rate of
depreciation of money relative to goods-which
means of course that goods are appreciating in value
relative to money. On the basis of this equation
Fisher concluded that,
The rate of interest in the (relatively) depreciating
standard is equal to the sum of three terms, viz.,
the rate of interest in the appreciating standard,
the rate of appreciation itself, and the product of
these two elements.  [6; p. 9]
Limiting Values of the Variables
Having derived the formula, Fisher next com-
mented on the plausible values of its component
variables. He noted, first, that the nominal rate could
never be negative in a world in which money can be
costlessly held. That is, he contended that because
people would hoard money rather than lending it at a
negative rate, the money rate of interest can never be
less than zero. And if the nominal rate cannot be less
than zero, it follows, he said, that prices can never
fall at a fully anticipated rate greater than the real
rate of interest-as can be seen by setting the nom-
inal rate at zero and solving the formula for the
resulting rate of price deflation.
4 In short, he argued
that the costless storage of money sets lower and
4 The fully  anticipated rate of deflation cannot exceed
the real rate of interest because, if it did, the real rate of
return on hoarded money would exceed  the real cost of
commodity  loans. Given this opportunity for profitable
arbitrage, everyone would want to borrow commodities
for conversion into cash. The resulting excess demand
for commodity loans would immediately bid up the real
(commodity) rate into equality with the price deflation
rate, thereby restoring parity between the two.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 7upper limits, respectively, to the nominal rate and
the fully anticipated rate of price deflation.
Empirical Tests
Fisher’s third contribution was to state and em-
pirically test the perfect and imperfect foresight inter-
pretations of the formula.
5 In this connection he
noted that if perfect foresight exists, then price
changes are accurately predicted and fully incor-
porated into nominal rates. As a result, these rates
fully adjust for inflation leaving the realized real loan
rate unchanged. Thus if perfect foresight prevailed,
one would expect to observe virtual constancy of the
realized real rate and one-for-one variations between
nominal rates and the rate of inflation. By contrast,
in the imperfect foresight case price changes are
incompletely anticipated and therefore are not fully
incorporated into nominal rates. As a result, the
latter do not fully adjust for inflation and conse-
quently the realized real loan rate changes. In this
case one would expect to find realized real rates
varying inversely with nominal rates and the latter
varying less than one-for-one with inflation rates.
Putting the perfect and imperfect foresight inter-
pretations to the empirical test, Fisher found that the
data largely contradicted the former interpretation
and confirmed the latter. That is, he found that while
nominal rates tended to move with inflation and
deflation, they did not move sufficiently to offset these
price changes and consequently realized real rates
changed. In particular, he found (1) that realized
real rates moved inversely to nominal rates, (2) that
they exhibited roughly 3½ times the variability of
nominal rates, and (3) that they were often negative
during periods of rapid inflation. Evidently price
changes drove a wedge between real and nominal
rates with the former bearing most of the adjustment
-an outcome clearly at odds with the perfect fore-
sight (constant realized real rate) hypothesis. On
the basis of this evidence, Fisher concluded that,
contrary to the perfect foresight model,. nominal rates
adjusted slowly and incompletely to inflation and
deflation because these phenomena were inadequately
foreseen.
Lagged Adjustment Mechanism
Fisher’s fourth contribution was to outline an alter-
native theory of interest rate adjustment consistent
with the facts. Abandoning the perfect foresight
5 What follows draws heavily from Rutledge [10].
framework for an imperfect foresight one, he pre-
sented a model in which transitory changes in real
variables play a key role in the adjustment process
and in which inflationary expectations are incor-
porated into nominal rates with long lags. He em-
ployed the model for two different purposes. He used
it, first, to show how the nominal rate reaches its
equilibrium level consistent with full adjustment to
inflation. He used it, second, to show how price
changes generate trade cycles.
Regarding the first use of his model, he explained
the process or mechanism through which an inflation
premium gets embodied in nominal rates. Employing
the assumptions (1) that firms are net borrowers,
(2) that firm owners by virtue of being entrepreneur:
possess foresight superior to that of lenders, and (3)
that entrepreneurs forecast profits extrapolatively, he
traced a chain of causation running from rising prices
and lagging nominal rates to falling real rates to
rising profits both actual and expected, then to in-
creasing loan demands and ‘thence back again to
nominal rates. More precisely, he argued that un-
expected inflation and sluggish nominal rates produce
falling real rates and hence windfall profits to bor-
rowers. The latter then forecast future profits ex-
trapolatively from those realized windfall profits and
adjust their loan demands accordingly. The resulting
rise in loan demand bids up the nominal rate by the
rate of inflation. He said :
Suppose an upward movement of prices begins.
Business profits (measured in money) will rise,
for profits are the difference between gross income
and expense, and if both these rise, their difference
will also rise. Borrowers can now afford to pay
higher “money interest”. If, however, only a few
persons see this, the interest will not be fully
adjusted and borrowers will realize an extra mar-
gin of profit after deducting interest charges. This
raises an expectation of a similar profit in the
future, and this expectation, acting on the demand
for loans, will raise the rate of interest. If the
rise is still inadequate, the process is repeated,
and thus by continual trial and error the rate
approaches the true adjustment. [6; pp. 75-76]
In this way, the nominal rate eventually adjusts to
inflation, albeit with some delay.
Price Movements, Real Rates, and
The Trade Cycle
With respect to the second use of his imperfect
foresight model, Fisher attempted to show how price
changes generate trade cycles by altering realized real
loan rates. His theory relied on the same assumption
as before, namely that business borrowers, by virtue
of being entrepreneurs, possess superior foresight and
8 ECONOMIC REVIEW, MAY/JUNE 1983therefore anticipate and adjust to inflation faster than
do lenders. Thus, according to him, when inflation
occurs, borrowers, perceiving that they will be able
to pay off their loans in dollars of lower purchasing
power than they borrowed, step up their loan de-
mands. Lenders, however: perceiving no such de-
preciation, maintain their loan supplies unchanged.
As a result, the loan demand curve shifts upward in
response to inflation whereas the loan supply curve
remains comparatively fixed. Assuming an upward
sloping loan supply curve, the result is a rise in the
nominal rate but one that is insufficient to compensate
for inflation, which means of course that the real loan
rate falls. This realized fall in the real cost of bor-
rowing manifests itself in the form of a windfall rise
in borrower profits. Assuming borrowers predict
future profits extrapolatively from realized past prof-
its and make their investment decisions accordingly,
the high realized profits will stimulate real invest-
ment and generate a business boom. Conversely,
when deflation occurs, loan demands fall relatively to
loan supplies. This causes nominal rates to fall but
not sufficiently to offset the deflation. The resulting
rise in the real cost of borrowing lowers profits and
generates expectations of more of the same, thereby
discouraging investment and depressing trade.
In short, inequality of expectations rather than
imperfection of expectations constitutes the key to
Fisher’s cycle model. Only the former, he says,
produce the disproportionate shifts in loan demand
and supply schedules that affect loan volume and eco-
nomic, activity. By contrast, imperfect (but equal)
expectations produce insufficient but identical adjust-
ments of loan demand and supply that affect nothing
but the real rate and distributive shares. In his
words:
We see, therefore, that while  imperfection  of, fore-
sight transfers wealth from creditor to debtor or
the reverse, inequality of foresight produces over-
investment during rising prices and relative stag-
nation during falling prices. [6; p. 78]
In so stating, he provided an explicit analytical model
consistent with Marshall’s conjecture that the trade
cycle largely  arises from “variations in the real rate
of interest which are caused by changes in the pur-
chasing power of money.” [8; p. 628] He also
showed how changes in nominal magnitudes can have
temporary real effects.
Summary and Conclusions
This article has traced the development of the real/
nominal interest rate relationship in pre-20th century
monetary thought. The article shows that neither the
relationship itself nor the analysis underlying it are
of recent origin. On the contrary, the article docu-
ments (1) that several 18th and 19th century econo-
mists stated the relationship, (2) that at least some
of them fully understood its implications for interest
rate adjustment and neutrality, and (3) that they
attempted to specify the mechanism or process
through which an inflation premium gets embodied in
market rates. From these findings at least four con-
clusions emerge.
The real/nominal rate distinction is of 18th
rather than 20th century vintage.
Irving Fisher, now generally regarded as the
father of real/nominal interest rate analysis,
originated none of the concepts now bearing his
name. Neither the so-called  Fisher relationship
(according to which the nominal rate equals
the real rate plus expected inflation), nor the
Fisher effect (according to which the nominal
rate fully adjusts for inflation leaving the real
rate intact), nor the  Fisher neutrality proposi-
tion (according to which equilibrium nominal
rate adjustments entail no real effects) origi-
nated with him. Rather they long predate him,
having been enunciated by earlier generations
of writers. Nevertheless, Fisher gave those
concepts their classic exposition. For that
reason his work is best regarded as the culmi-
nation rather than the origin of classical and
neoclassical analysis of the real/nominal rate
relationship.
Except for Douglass and Mill, all the writers
surveyed above recognized the distinction be-
tween complete and incomplete adjustment of
the nominal rate to inflation. The former they
identified with the perfect foresight, constant
realized real rate model and the latter with an
imperfect foresight, lagged adjustment model.
That is, they argued that while the nominal
rate would fully adjust for inflation in steady
state equilibrium, it would not do so instantan-
eously. During a temporary transition period
it would exhibit lagged adjustment thereby pro-
ducing deviations from equilibrium of the real-
ized real rate. This was on the grounds that,
because expectations are formed extrapolatively,
changes in inflation are inadequately foreseen
such that expected inflation lags behind actual
inflation resulting in incomplete adjustment of
the nominal rate.
Early writers stressed that these incomplete
nominal rate movements would, by altering real-
ized real rates, affect the distribution of income
between borrowers and lenders. To these dis-
tributional effects Marshall and Fisher added
the notions of differential expectations and un-
equal shifts in loan demand and supply curves
to demonstrate how incomplete nominal rate
adjustment could also affect real output and
employment. Thus, although the early formu-
lators of the real/nominal rate analysis postu-
lated perfect foresight, complete adjustment,
and nominal rate neutrality as necessary condi-
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 9tions of steady state equilibrium, they did not
assume that those conditions would hold con-
tinuously. That is, they did not adhere to the
view that the nominal rate always adjusts fully
and instantaneously to inflation so as to leave
all real magnitudes-including distributive
shares and real output-undisturbed.
the notion  that people form expectations of future
profits and inflation not so much from observed past
values  of those variables as from informed predic-
tions of future events-e.g., prospective monetary
growth-influencing them. Modern analysts have
also abandoned the Marshall-Fisher doctrine of
In reaching  these conclusions, they established most differential expectations. Except for these elements,
of the  elements of modern real/nominal rate analysis. however, the earlier analysis was much the same as
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